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RECENT DECISIONS
not controlling. Arbuckles & Co. Ltd. v. Chadwick, 146 Pa. 393, 23 Atl. 346
(1892).
Not to allow free application by a creditor would unduly hamper business
relations, the surety always having ample opportunity to protect itself. City of
Marshfleld ex tel McGeorge Gravel Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., supra. The burden of discovering the state of a contractor's secured amounts
should not be put on his creditors even though they received payment with
knowledge that it is compensation for work covered by a surety bond. Mack v.
Colleran et al., 136 N.Y. 617, 32 N.E. 604 (1892).
The exact question of the principal case apparently has not arisen in Wis-
consin, and the views of the neighboring states are in conflict. At one time
Minnesota held to the rule of free application regardless of knowledge. Jefferson
v. Church. of St. Matthew, supra. Yet where an agent had turned over certain
money derived from Insurance contracts made under his agency wherein his
faithful performance was assured and the company had applied the money to
a prior agency contract, the Minnesota court has held that the funds must be
applied to the assured agency contract. Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Herber, supra.
But it has been since pointed out that any money remitted under an agency
never does belong to the agent, and such cases are to be distinguished from those
in which the money, regardless of source, is the debtor's own until paid to the
creditor. Standard Oil Co. v. Day, supra; Radichel v. Federal Surety Co., 170
Minn. 92, 212 N.W. 171 (1927); Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Union
State Bank of Minneapolis, 21 F. (2d) 102 (D. Minn. 1927).
While at one time Iowa held that where there was no direction by either
creditor or debtor, the court would apply the fund to the unsecured claim, Cain
v. Vogt, 138 Iowa 631, 116 N.W. 786 (1908), the law in both Iowa and Illinois
today seems to be that all funds derived from an assured contract must be
applied by the creditor to the assured debt. Sioux City Foundry & Mfg. Co. v.
Merten, supra; Alexander Ln'ber Co. v. Aetna Accident & Liability Co., supra.
Michigan has rather generally held to the doctrine of free application, People
v. Powers, supra, and where neither debtor nor creditor directs application, and
the fund is applied to a general or open account, the court will make the
application, usually applying the first payment to the oldest debt. Grasser &
Brand Brewing Co. v. Rogers et al., supra.
In Georgia, the view of letting the creditor apply the fund to any debt regard-
less of source and regardless of knowledge is statutory: "When a payment is
made by a debtor to a creditor holding several demands against him, the
debtor has a right to direct the claim to which it should be appropriated. If he
fails to do so the creditor has a right to appropriate at his election. If neither
exercises this privilege the law will direct the application in such manner as is
reasonable and equitable, both as to the parties and third persons. As a general
rule the oldest lien and the oldest item in an account will be first paid, the
presumption of law being that such would be the fair intention of the parties."
Civil Code of 1910 § 4316. Baumgartner v. McKinnon, supra.
RAYmoND A. HUEVLER.
Torts-Liability of Manufacturer to Consumer for Defects in Manufacture
of Articles.-A hot water bottle was purchased from a dealer. As a result of a
defect in the bottle, the plaintiff, a two-year old child at the time of the acci-
dent, was scalded by hot water. Action was brought in tort, against the manu-
facturer, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered. Held, the maker of
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the bottle was not liable since there was no contractual relationship between
the defendant and the plaintiff. The bottle was not an inherently dangerous
article, but harmless in kind, and dangerous only by reason of a defect about
which it appeared that the defendant knew nothing. Smith v. Davidson Rubber
Co., 35 N.E. (2d) 486 (Mass. 1940).
The manufacturer of an article of merchandise, which he puts on the mar-
ket, is not responsible in damages to those who may receive injuries caused by
its defective construction, but to whom he sustains no contractual relations,
although by exercise of reasonable diligence he should have know of the defect,
Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 80 N.E. 482 (Mass. 1907). By reason of its
wide application this rule has found three famous exceptions which are given
lucid organization in the well-known case, Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Ma-
chine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C.C.A. 8th, 1903). They are: (1) An act of negligence
of the manufacturer or vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or
health of mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale of an
article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is actionable by third
parties who suffer from the negligence. (2) An owner's act of negligence
which causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance,
upon the owner's premises, may form the basis of an action against the owner.
(3) One who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently
dangerous to life or limb of another, without notice of its qualities, is liable
to any person who suffers an injury therefrom, which might have been ancipi-
pated, whether or not there was any contractual relation between the parties.
For detailed treatment of the liability of the manufacturer in these cases, see
Seefeld, Tort Liability of Manufacturers to Users of their Goods, 25 MARQ. L.
REv. 173 (1941).
In deciding the principle case, the Massachusetts court devoted itself reli-
giously to the old rule demanding a contractual relationship between the plain-
tiff and the manufacturer, and saw no place for the case in any of the three
exceptions. The adherence of the courts to this statement of the law, and their
interpretations of what articles fall into the exceptions, vary in the several
states. However, the increasing scope of articles coming under the exceptions
has been repeatedly pointed out by the courts. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916 F., 696 (1916). There, in discussing
the first exception to the general rule as expounded in one of the earliest cases,
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), which made a manufacturer of drugs
liable to a third party to the contract for negligently placing a false label on a
bottle of poison, the court, in the person of Justice Cardozo, said, "Whatever
the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may have once been, it no longer has that
restricted meaning. A scaffold (Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882)) is not
inherently a destructive instrument. It becomes destructive only if imperfectly
constructed. A large coffee urn (Statter v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478 (1909))
may have within itself if negligently made, the potency of danger, yet no one
thinks of it as an implement whose normal function is destruction. What is true
of the coffee urn is equally true of bottles of aerated water (Torgeson v.
Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156 (1908)) ... We hold then that the principle of Thomas v.
Winchester is not limited to poison, explosives, and things of like nature, to
things which in the normal operation are implements of destruction. If the
nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made, it is a thing of danger. Its nature gives warn-
ing of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is
added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
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and used without new tests, then irrespective of contract, the manufacturer
of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully."
However, the Massachusetts court has either been tardy or ultra conserva-
tive in departing from the strictest construction of the rules in question.
"Danger is inherent when it is due to the nature of an article and not a defect
in an article naturally harmless; but the dangerous quality is none the less
inherent because it is brought into action by some external force." Farley v.
Standard Pyroroloid Corp., 171 N.E. 639 (Mass. 1930). In this case the court
excluded from the class of inherently dangerous articles those things which
become dangerous to human life because of a defect.
The trend in Wisconsin is pointed out in the Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co.,
196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928). "A tendency appears in some recent cases
to extend the class of inherently dangerous articles, so as to include not only
those that in their ordinary state are dangerous to health and safety, such as
poisons and explosives, but also those that are reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril because of negligent preparation." Thus the Wisconsin court
takes the modern view by saying that a manufacturer who places a manufac-
tured article in trade and commerce, not inherently dangerous, but because of
its negligent construction, imminently dangerous to lift and limb, is liable to
one who sustains injuries by reason of such negligent construction. Bright v. The
Barnett & Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418 (1894); Coakley v. Prentiss-
Wabers Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94, 195 N.W. 388 (1923). The Wisconsin court was
able to hold that boiler tubes which burst under normal pressure eight days
after installation in a furnace were things of danger if negligently made, Marsh
Wood Products Co. v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392
(1932), while the Massachusetts court insisted that a kitchen hot water tank
is not an article recognized as inherently dangerous to life or property, relieving
the manufacturer of liability, Giberti v. James Barrett Mfg. Co., 165 N.E. 19
(Mass. 1929).
Perhaps the most heartening force which can be lent to the better sense of
the Wisconsin doctrine comes from a case decided in the U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals, Reed and Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F. (2d) 359 (C.C.A. 1st, 1934).
The plaintiff a Wisconsin resident, was severely burned when a coffee urn,
purchased from a Masachusetts manufacturer, spilled its boiling contents over
her when a negligently constructed support gave away. The case finally reached
the federal court where the defendant contended that under the Massachustts
law a manufacturer owes no duty to a third party in case of an article not
inherently dangerous, citing the Lebourdais case, supra, and Windram Manu-
facturing Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921). But
the plaintiff showed that under the law of Wisconsin the manufacturer of an
article is liable for any injury due to his negligence in manufacture, where the
article is not inherently dangerous, but due to the negligence in manufacture is
likely to cause injuries even if properly used, Bright v. Barnett and Record Co.,
supra; Miller v. Mead Morrison Co., 166 Wis. 536, 166 N.W. 315 (1918) ; Flies
v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., supra. The appellate court held that the rule applied
in the federal courts is not contra to that in Wisconsin and New York, citing
Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Corp., supra; Keep v. National Tube Co.,
154 Fed. 121 (C.C., D. N.J., 1907); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co., 261 Fed. 878
(C.C.A., 2nd 1919).
It is not difficult to see the similarity between the principal case and the
Reed Barton case, supra. In the light of the decisions in these various cases
one can not help but conclude that Massachusetts is adhering to a wornout
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principle, which refuses to recognize a changing world where a manufacturer
is no longer dealing directly with the users of his goods, but must, of necessity,
contemplate that parties who are strangers to the contract will use his product.
It seems to the writer that the rule of the Wisconsin and New York courts
states a policy which is more in accord with the present social and economic
realities.
PHILI W. CROM.
